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SSH, the Secure Shell, is a popular software-based approach to network security. It is a
protocol that allows user to log into another computer over a network, to execute
commands in a remote machine, and to move files from one machine to another. It
provides authentication and encrypted communications over unsecured channels.
However, SSH protocol has an inherent security flaw. It is vulnerable to the “man-in-the-
middle Attack”, when a user establishes his first SSH connection from a particular client
to a remote machine. My thesis entails designing, evaluating and prototyping a public key
infrastructure which can be used with the SSH2 protocol, in an academic setting, thus
eliminating this vulnerability due to the man in the middle attack. The approach presented
is different from the one that is based on the deployment of a Certificate Authority. My
scheme does not necessarily require third party verification using a Certificate Authority;
it is decentralized in nature and is relatively easy to set up.
Keywords used: SSH, PKI, digital certificates, Certificate Authority, certification path,
LDAP servers, Certificate Revocation List, X509v3 Certificate, OpenSSL, mutual
authentication, and tunneled authentication.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This research thesis develops a minimal and yet scalable solution for the “Man-in-the-
Middle-Attack” problem in the SSH protocol.
This paper offers guidelines to develop a practicable and a viable Infrastructure for
certificate usage for SSH so that the user can be certain that he has mutual ly1
authenticated with the server, in an academic setting such as the one at Dartmouth.
Design constraints on the certificate authority, such as certificate generation, distribution,
verification, revocation, and management have also been evaluated so that the user has
to make a minimal effort to set up an ssh client and use it securely.
The deployment constraints, design considerations and scalability issues with in a
Dartmouth scenario are also evaluated in this paper. Dartmouth College has a
decentralized network with several LANS each independent of the other and connected
to a central backbone. Each building has its own LAN that is independently managed.
The network at Dartmouth has roughly 8,000 ports.
The design and code that was written to develop the prototype is open source and
modifies the SSH protocol. It is based on the original open source code for TeraTerm
SSH client that was written by Robert O'Callahan and OpenSSL libraries2. There are two
ssh protocols, the SSH1 protocol and the SSH2 protocol. The SSH1 and the SSH2
protocols encrypt at different parts of the packets. The SSH2 protocol is a complete
rewrite of the SSH1 protocol, and it does not use the same networking implementation
that the SSH1 does [14.ii]. They have slightly different Key Exchange Algorithms.
                                                 
1 The user is authenticated at the server and the server key is verified on the client machine.
2 The source code written and modified for this project is placed at www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~yasir/pki
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Generally, the SSH2 protocol is considered more secure, as it avoids known
vulnerabilities in the SSH1 implementation. Amongst the SSH products, there are
OpenSSH and SSH clients and servers. Both the products implement the SSH1 and the
SSH2 protocols. OpenSSH client and server are open source and are distributed freely
with Red Hat Linux distributions. SSH client and server are developed by SSH Inc. and
are available for Windows and Linux platforms.
Based on this research, Professor Sean Smith and I have also submitted a paper,
“Flexible and Scalable Public Key Security for SSH”, for the second annual PKI Research
Workshop.
1A. This Paper:
The next section provides the background knowledge to understand the problem. The
third section discusses the possible solutions and their weaknesses as I lay groundwork
for my solution and then describe my solution. The fourth section presents the design
considerations for a viable Public Key Infrastructure for SSH in a “Dartmouth” setting. The
fifth section presents architectural and implementation details. The sixth section
highlights related work on this problem. The seventh section summarizes and concludes
this paper. The last section provides definitions for the PKI terms used in this paper.
2. BACKGROUND
Putting it simply, the SSH2 protocol allows two hosts to construct a secure channel for
data communication using DSA (public key authentication) and a diffie-hellman-group1-
9
sha1 exchange3. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange provides a shared secret key that
cannot be determined by either party alone. The shared secret key established is used as
a session key. Once an encrypted tunnel is created using this key, the context for
negotiated compression algorithm, and encryption algorithm are initialized. These
algorithms may use independent keys in each direction. The first session key established
is randomly unique for every session. The OpenSSH clients, using the SSH2 protocol,
allow re-keying (generating a new session key for an existing session) if the user
requests during a session (by typing ~R). The SSH server provided by OpenSSH can be
configured to provide automatic re-keying after a specified interval.
At this point, it is important to distinguish the difference between mutual authentication
and client authentication. Mutual authentication is where two entities authenticate
themselves to each other. The user on client machine verifies that the server machine is
in fact the one it claims to be, similarly the server verifies that the user at the client
machine is the one who has an account on the server. Client Authentication is where only
the user on the client machine authenticates himself to the server. SSH supports both
types of authentication. In case of client authentication, if the fingerprint4 sent by the
server does not match the one that is already stored in a file on the client machine, the
user on the client machine would either receive a warning with the option of accepting the
new fingerprint as it is, or the client would drop the connection.
It is important to realize that when a user on a client machine tries to establish a secure
channel with a remote machine using the SSH2 protocol, at least four entities are
involved:
                                                 
3 The "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" method specifies Diffie-Hellman Group and Key Exchange with
SHA-1 as HASH. It is used to establish a shared key in SSH2. The SSH1 protocol uses RSA-style exchange to
establish a shared key, which uses an ephemeral server key other than the server host key.
4 Fingerprints are typically 1024 bits, rsa or dsa, public keys for the server. Public key lengths can
be 512 or 2048 as well. The fingerprints are stored unencrypted on
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- The SSH client on the client machine,
- The SSH Daemon (SSH server) running on the remote server host,
- The user on the client machine and
- The administrator on the remote server host.
The user can use various client machines to log in to a specific server. He may or may
not be required to log on to the client machines. The role of the administrator is restricted
as he is mainly responsible for configuring the security parameters on an sshd server and
ascertaining that the sshd server is running properly.




Algorithm Negotiation is mainly responsible for determining the encryption algorithms,
compression algorithms and the authentication methods supported and to be used
between the client and the server.
Algorithm Negotiation is followed by Authentication. Authentication is further broken down
in two pieces:
- Key exchange (transport layer) [14.i,14.ii]
- User authentication (user authentication layer) [14.iii]
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The purpose of the key exchange is dual. Firstly, it attempts to authenticate the server to
the client. Secondly, a shared key is established which is used as a session key to
encrypt all the data being transferred between the two machines. The session key
encrypts the payload and a hash generated for integrity checking of the payload using the
private key of the server. The client verifies the server’s public key, verifies the server
signature received and then continues with user authentication.  User authentication
methods that are supported and are a part of the SSH2 protocol include passwords,
public key, OpenPGP certificates, X509v3 certificates, PAM, and Kerberos [16].
Currently, the latest openssh3.4 client does not provide any code that verifies certificates
or certificate chains. Certificates are merely treated as public keys. If a key blob, which is
the technical name for a data structure that loads the public key, contains a certificate
instead of a public key, openssh3.4 has routines that can extract the public key out of the
certificate and after that it only uses that public key for authentication and integrity
checking purposes. Once Authentication is successful, one of the negotiated encryption
algorithms is used to encrypt the data transferred between the two machines. Other
features that are a part of ssh clients include port forwarding, however such features will
not be discussed in this paper.
Following is a diagram [14.ii] showing the key exchange mechanism that comes after the
“algorithm negotiation” stage. The key exchange produces two values: a shared secret K,
and an exchange hash H.  Given the following variables,
n is a number of bits the client requested,
p is a large safe prime,
g is a generator for a subgroup of GF(p), usually set to be equal to 2,
q is the order of the subgroup;
V_S is Server's version string;
V_C is Client's version string;
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K_S is Server's public host key;
I_C is Client's KEXINIT  message and
I_S is Server's KEXINIT message (which have been exchanged before the key exchange
begins).
The client generates a random number x where (1 < x < q) and the server generates a
random number y where (0 < y < q) and initiate the protocol as shown below [14.i,14.ii]:
Figure 1 Transport Layer Key Exchange
Figure 2 User Authentication Layer

























































e = g^x mod p.
 f = g^y mod p
 K = e^y mod p
 H = hash(V_C ||
                 V_S ||
                  I_C ||
                  I_S ||
                  K_S ||
                  e || f || K)
 s = signature  on H
with its private host
key.
(SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY), K_S || f || s
verifies that K_S really
is the host key
computes:
K = f^x mod p
H = hash(V_C || V_S ||
                I_C || I_S ||
                K_S || e || f









The OpenSSH client, which is an open source ssh client using the SSH2 protocol,
manages the key pairs as follows [16]:
- Each “user” creates a public/ private key pair, if he intends to use “public key
authentication” on any client machine. However, that public key fingerprint needs
to be added in to the database of the server, before authentication can proceed.
- Similarly the sshd (on the server) maintains private and public key pairs created
by the root under etc/ssh. Typically there is a key pair based on RSA and another
key pair based on DSA.
- The user account on the client machine maintains a database of all the public
keys of the ssh servers to which a user logged in using SSH (
$HOME/.SSH2/knownhosts )
- If the client does not have a m a t c h i n g  public key of the server in
$HOME/.SSH2/authorization, the user can configure the security on his machine
so that it accepts the public key provided by the remote server and overwrites the
existing one. It prompts the user to save the updated public host key. However
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the user can configure the security, such that in such a scenario, the connection
would be declined.
- If the client does not have a public key (at all) of the server machine (i.e. it is
connecting to the remote machine for the first time through that client machine), it
accepts the fingerprint provided by the remote machine and stores it locally
under that specific user account.
Given this brief description of how the public keys are managed, it is easy to deduce that
the client blindly trusts the server and accepts its public key during a “first time”
connection. An intruder or an attacker can intercept in such an exchange scenario
required to establish future secure sessions and render the SSH channel to be insecure.
This brings us to a point where we can evaluate the various security vulnerabilities in ssh.
2A. The Man in the middle Attack
Suppose Alice (user) wants to talk to Bob (server) and a malicious user Trudy wants to
play the man-in-the-middle attack.
- Alice initiates a connection with Bob.
- Bob sends his public key to Alice, which Trudy intercepts;
- Trudy then sends her own public key to Alice.
- Alice accepts the new public key and stores in its database. If it was the “first
time authentication”, it would blindly add the public key provided by Trudy
thinking that it is Bob’s public key.
- Alice then sends her username and password to Bob that is again intercepted
by Trudy.
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- Trudy decrypts Alice’s username and password using the session key and her
private key,
- Trudy then encrypts Alice’s credentials using the public key provided by Bob
and forwards the new packet to him.
- Bob authenticates Trudy thinking that it authenticated Alice.
Trudy can now be really nasty, if she sends rm –rf * command to Bob and Bob deletes
Alice’s user account. Trudy can also just accumulate user id and password pairs.
She might just pass Alice on to Bob, so Alice's session works
as normal. Except Trudy can log in later.
2B. Spoofing Attack
Spoofing is when user A claims to be user B and establishes a secure channel with host
C . C thinks that it has established a secure connection with B but in fact it has
established a channel with A . User A  hides his real identity and forges a false
identification. Such an attack is possible as we do not trust the underlying network.
User spoofing is possible when an innocent user B on a client machine attempts to
establish a connection with a remote host C. A malicious server A intercepts the channel
when it is being initiated, fakes to be remote host C and replies back with its own public
key.
If the SSH client configuration on B is set to non-strict host key checking (which is the
default installation configuration), it would ask the user to overwrite the previous key
stored in its database for host C and proceed with establishing a connection. If it was the
“first time” authentication by B on that specific client, he would accept the server host key
anyway.  In a common scenario, the user performs password authentication to the
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remote server. In that case, the malicious remote server can accept the credentials
provided by B and then output the error message that invalid password was provided (the
user can re-enter his password twice and the server would give the same error message)
and then disconnect. For any future sessions, an attacker can now use B’s credentials
retrieved from malicious server A and then pose to be user B.
The “Spoofing Attack “ stems from the same basic vulnerability where a traveling user
has to retrieve the server public key for the first as was the case in the “Man in the Middle
Attack”.
2C. A lesser significant Knownhosts2 file Attack
Suppose a hacker hacks Alice’s password on a specific server machine. He can then
proceed with his attack on other machines by looking up Knownhosts2 file in Alice’s
home directory (~alice/.SSH2 ). He can attempt to break into all the listed machines in
the Knownhosts2 file using Alice’s username and password. If Alice used the same
username and password for those machines, in all likelihood, the hacker would
successfully break into those machines as well.
2D. SSH Security Vulnerability
Given this description of “spoofing” and “Man in the middle Attack”, we now focus on the
reasons why SSH authentication model is weak.
1. When the server sends its public key and its signature, since they are not signed
by a third party, it is trivial for an attacker to sit in the middle and intercept the
connection, and send his own public key and signature instead;
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2. When the user sends his own password, to the attacker thinking that he is the
server, the username and password are compromised by the attacker as shown
in the previous attack scenarios.
3. If it is the first time the user is connecting to a host and hence does not have the
server's public key stored locally, he will be none the wiser. The attacker can
send his public key to be stored instead of the real server.  If the user does have
the server's public key, when the attacker sends his own public key instead, the
user will generally receive a warning like “Warning: server's key has changed.
Continue?” Most users typically hit  “Yes” and do not realize the risk that
someone might be trying to compromise the security of his connection by putting
the attackers own public key in use instead of the real server’s public key.
Unless both parties have some pre-established shared data, any authentication system
will probably be susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack.
3. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Before we delve into discussing our solution, let us explore existing authentication
methodologies that can be used or integrated into SSH Clients to resolve the problems
identified above. The prerequisites and the drawbacks for each one of those
methodologies would also be discussed. After analyzing these authentication solutions,
our proposed authentication solution would be presented and evaluated. At this point it is
pertinent to mention that the latest SSH Clients by SSH Inc., provide a solution to resolve
the vulnerabilities discussed in this paper [16i]. Their solution is based on the deployment
of a Certificate Authority that issues certificates to all the SSH servers. The SSH client
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retrieves the CA Certificate first and then uses it to perform server certificate verification.
Their solution is discussed in greater detail, in the “related work” section of this paper.
3A. Solution 1: TLS (Transport Layer Security using User Certificates)
TLS is based on Secure Socket Layer protocol (SSLv3), and performs the SSL
handshake for authentication. It allows for mutual authentication between the user and
the server, using certificates.
The user on the client machine must have:
- User Certificate.
- CA Certification Path5 installed on the client machine.
The server must have:
- Server Certificate
- CA Certification Path (or the CA Certificate)
By using certificates, the problem caused by the lack of proper verification of the
fingerprints in the SSH2 protocol would be solved, as now when a user receives a new
server certificate (instead of a new fingerprint), the user can verify whether the root CA
signed the new certificate. If so, then it is a valid certificate and it can continue with
authentication. It would no longer be a judgment call, where the user decides on his own
                                                 
5 A certification path is an ordered list of certificates. If a certification path meets certain
validation rules, it may be used to securely establish the mapping of a public key to a subject.
Typically , the last node in the ordered list of certificates is the CA certificate. A CA certification
path is a list of certificates that establish a validation path for a  user certificate to the CA
certificate
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will if he wants to accept the fingerprint or not. Similarly when it is a first time
authentication, it can verify that the certificate received is actually the right one.
Prerequisites:
A successful deployment of a Root Certificate Authority is integral to the success of this
solution. A Certificate Authority is responsible for generating, revoking, signing, storing
and managing certificates.  A ‘Trusted’ Root certificate authority is a certificate authority
whose signing of a certificate serves as a crucial link for it to be authentic to the
connecting hosts. An ‘Intermediate’ certificate authority is a certificate authority that
vouches for the authenticity of other certificate authorities and it has a root certificate
authority vouching for its own authenticity. However, it does not issue any user
certificates.
OpenSSL provides a set of open source libraries that allow verification of certificates and
certificate chains that is needed for such a solution. Currently, this library is being used in
several commercial products. RSA’s B-safe libraries also provide a similar set of libraries.
Microsoft Certificate Store (viewed from inside Internet Explorer or Microsoft
Management Console in Windows 2000 and XP) contains a list of root trusted CA, that
are used in verification during SSL handshakes. Using OpenSSL libraries and the
Microsoft crypto libraries, certificates can be accessed and verified from the Microsoft
Certificate Store. This lays out a clean design for setting up, storing and accessing
underlying user certificate structures. Netscape and Mozilla also offer browser-based
certificate stores that can be accessed in a similar fashion.
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In terms of ease of use, most Certificate Authorities that run on Windows Operating
System are easy to set up and use. Microsoft Certificate Authority runs on a Windows
2000 Advanced Server. There are also open source CA’s such as OpenCA that can be
downloaded and set up.
Dissemination of user certificates in the Dartmouth scenario would require a web
interface that would allow users to download their user certificates and certification paths.
The web interface would be protected by a Kerberos log in mechanism that is already
deployed fully at Dartmouth. The user credentials could be verified via Kerberos log in or
using default domain log in mechanism provided by Windows 2000. Bob Brentrup is
currently heading the deployment of a PKI and Trust Hierarchies at Dartmouth.
Drawbacks:
When a user uses a new client machine that is outside the realm of Dartmouth, he would
not have the Certification Path installed on the machine, therefore he will not be able to
verify whether the certificate received by the server is valid or not.  Suppose that the
Dartmouth Certificate Authority protected by a login mechanism is accessible from
outside the Dartmouth realm6, the user successfully retrieves the CA certificate. However,
he still needs to verify that he received the correct certificate. An attacker can use IP
spoofing or DNS spoofing to send him a fake CA certificate. The existing solutions for this
problem require setting up CA hierarchies that lead to scalability issues. The TLS solution
would work if the Dartmouth CA was certified by one of the standard browser trust roots
which is an expensive proposition.
                                                 
6 this poses security risks as hackers can attempt to access user certificates by password guessing. According
to some studies, students tend to have passwords that can be guessed by dictionary attacks.
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Secondly, user certificates installed on a client machine, no longer remain user specific.
Instead they become machine specific. Therefore if a user downloads his certificate on a
specific machine, he will have to delete it, before he leaves the machine. Otherwise a
malicious user can impersonate him by using his certificate on that machine. This
problem would come up on machines where the users are not required to log in to use
the machine7.
Thirdly, most users want to use “hassle” free authentication mechanisms, where once the
machine is configured for authentication, they will not have to modify it again. This
solution requires vigilance on the part of the user.
Fourthly, dedicated resources, both human and machine, are needed to manage and
track the certificates issued to users, which makes it an expensive scheme. Furthermore
it poses security risks as anyone with a Kerberos log in can access the Certificate
Authority, including students who like to consider themselves hackers.
3B. Solution 2: Smart Cards/Tokens (using X509 Certificates)
Smart cards can store certificates on them. The certificate image and the certificate path
are stored on the local storage on the smart cards may also be protected by a pin
number/pass-phrase if they store the private key corresponding to the certificate.
A smart card is plugged into a smart card device, which is plugged into the USB port. It
may export its x509v3 certificate image and certification path onto the Microsoft certificate
store. The Certificate image must contain the public key and it can also have a private
key that would either reside on the smart card or in the certificate manager. The user can
                                                 
7 For instance machines with Windows 98, ME, or Irix (sgi) with guest accounts
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then use his ssh client to perform TLS authentication using smart card certificates. Ideally
when the user unplugs the smart card, it should remove the certificate from the Microsoft
certificate store, however not all the smart cards work that way. USB-Tokens can be
directly plugged into a USB port and do not require a smart card reader. Unlike the
traditional smart cards, they cannot be kept in a wallet, but can be put on a key chain.
It solves the problem where if the user used a machine outside the realm of Dartmouth,
he did not have access to the certificate. Given he has access to a smart card for
traditional smart card readers, and the right drivers installed for USB-token he can use
the ssh client from anywhere.
Drawbacks:
Smart card is a hardware solution where the user must carry this piece of equipment with
him. In a Dartmouth scenario, students would be required to carry these cards with them.
Unless these smart cards become a part of the Dartmouth ID card, there is a low
feasibility for a successful deployment of smart cards. Secondly, smart card reader
devices need to be installed on every machine that would be used for ssh. For USB-
tokens, one would need to install drivers on all client machines. Furthermore a fully
developed Public Key Infrastructure would still be needed where a certificate authority
would issue smart card certificates; the system administrator would burn the certificate
image onto the smart card, and keep track of those certificates and the smart cards as
well. Lastly, if the user goes outside of the Dartmouth realm, there is no certainty that he
would find the same vendor specific smart card reader on a machine, where he can plug
in his smart card and use ssh. As yet smart card technology is not scalable and is
expensive. Furthermore there are various smart card vendors in the industry and are not
fully interoperable with each other. PKCS #11 provides a method for accessing hardware
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devices in a device neutral manner, however not all the smart card devices implement
that yet. USB-tokens need driver and software installation on a client machine before
they can be used. Typically these installations are also vendor specific.
3C. Solution 3: TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security using Passwords)
This is an extension to TLS, where the user is not required to have a client certificate;
instead a user name and a password are used.
- The Server sends the server certificate.
- The Client verifies the server certificate by checking if a trusted root authority
signed it.
- If verification succeeds, the user sends his username and password over a
channel encrypted by a session key. There are various protocols that can be
used for this purpose. Some of them are one-time password protocols, challenge
response protocols, or even sending the plaintext username and password
through the encrypted channel.
This method of authentication is similar to the SSH2 protocol where the user verifies the
server fingerprint by looking up its database. If the fingerprint matches, it creates an
encrypted tunnel (using symmetric session keys) and then the user sends his username
and password. TTLS is superior to the SSH2 protocol mainly because of its server
certificate verification mechanism where the signature of a root CA on the server
certificate is verified.
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This authentication methodology has the advantage that it is easily deployable in an
academic setting or within a corporate set up, as it does not require the deployment of
user certificates.
However the drawback is the same that the user needs to have the CA certification path
(or the CA certificate) installed on the client machine, which means that he needs to
somehow access it securely and install it on his machine if it is not already installed.
PEAP (Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol) is a similar authentication protocol
used in wireless networks, using the same underlying concepts as that of TTLS.
Therefore this paper will not discuss PEAP.
3D. Solution 4: LEAP (Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol)
This proprietary authentication method is developed by CISCO. It provides mutual
authentication between the user on a client machine (supplicant), and a radius server
(authentication server), through a wireless Access Point (authenticator) on a wireless
network. What makes this authentication protocol so interesting is that it does not use
server certificate or a public key to authenticate the server. Instead, it uses a two way
Challenge Response mechanism to validate the radius server to the supplicant. Following
is a quotation from Cisco’s website8:
“For its Aironet solution, Cisco created an authentication scheme based
on the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) called EAP-Cisco
Wireless or LEAP. Using the 802.1x draft standard for port-based
security as a foundation, but with the necessary modifications for
WLANs, LEAP provides mutual authentication between Cisco Aironet
client cards and the backend Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
(RADIUS) server”
                                                 
8 http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/784/packet/jul01/p74-cover.html
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Wireless Security Research group at the MISSL Lab at University of Maryland analyzed
LEAP9 and deduced that LEAP although offers mutual authentication, poses security
risks in its authentication mechanism. A shortcoming of LEAP is the fact that when
authentication takes place it has to take place in the "Open mode”. If a client is trying to
authenticate for the first time, he needs to know the current link layer communication
(WEP) key. Their work shows that authentication in open mode is very insecure and
vulnerable.
On the following page is a table summarizing the differences between these
authentication schemes.
                                                 
9 http://www.missl.cs.umd.edu/wireless/ethereal/leap.txt
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Table 1 Authentication Schemes
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So far we have seen that none of the previous solutions are “lightweight”. Also, they do
not fully resolve the following two issues:
- They do not make “first time” authentication on a new client machine secure for a
traveling user.
- They are not easy to deploy in an academic setting where many users share a
group of machines, or use their own machines.
Furthermore, it has been observed that most of the users are comfortable with using
usernames and passwords instead of using client certificates, which is a hassle for both,
- the user as he has to manage it on his machine and is required to install it on any
machine he may intend to use for ssh, and
- the system administrators who may be responsible for issuing, or revoking
certificates and managing the certificate authority and a registration authority. 
Lastly, system administrators desire minimal maintenance once they have set up the ssh
server. The desired goals of our solution are as follows[15]:
- The solution should enable users from borrowed (but trusted) clients to establish
trusted connections to their home machines.
- The solution should be adoptable in the near-term by small groups of users with
only a small delta from the current infrastructure.
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- The solution should accommodate users in domains where conscientious
sysadmins can set up trustable and usable CA services.
- The solution should accommodate users in domains where no such services
exist.
- The solution should not require that a new universal PKI hierarchy be established
before any of this works.
- The solution should not require that a user memorize the fingerprints of all
servers he wishes to interact with.
To solve the problem, the client needs to have some trust root upon which to build the
conclusion that the binding of the server’s public key to identity is meaningful. The “small
delta” and “no new universal PKI” constraints mean that we cannot hard-code this trust
root into the client (and that different users might have different roots). The “no
memorization” constraint means that the user cannot bring it with them.[15]
This analysis thus forces us to have the client download the user’s trust root over the
network. Since changing how the SSH protocol itself works would also violate the “small
delta” constraint, we need download this data out of band. However, this raises a
conundrum: if the user cannot trust the network against man-in-the-middle attacks on the
public key the server sends in SSH, how can the user trust the network against man-in-
the-middle attacks against this out of band data? [15]
To answer this, we use a keyed MAC—a “poor man’s digital signature.” Also known as a
keyed hash, a keyed MAC algorithm takes a message M and a secret key k, and
produces a mac value Mac(M; k) with the property that it is believed infeasible to find
another M0; k0 pair that generate the same keyed MAC. Thus, if Bob knows secret key k,
and retrieves a message M accompanied by a MAC value h which he confirms as
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Mac(M; k), then Bob can conclude that M was produced by a party that knew k and has
not been altered in transit.  Our constraints dictate that we cannot force the user to
memorize a public key—but users easily memorize URLs and pass phrases.[15]
Taking into consideration these design constraints, this paper presents two authentication
mechanisms.
- A Centralized Minimal PKI Approach
- A Decentralized Non-CA Approach
Before we describe how these schemes work, it is pertinent to provide a brief description
of a Message Authentication Code, HMAC, used in these approaches.
i. HMAC
HMAC [6] is a Keyed Message Authentication Code Algorithm. It requires a cryptographic
hash function, H that typically uses MD5 or SHA-1 and a secret key K. The cryptographic
hash function hashes the data by iterating a basic compression function on blocks of
data. The byte-length (B) of such blocks is typically set to 64 bytes. The byte-length of
hash outputs is 16 bytes for MD5 and 20 bytes for SHA1. The authentication key K can
be of any length up to the block length of the hash function. In any case the minimal
recommended length for the secret key is equal to the hash output length.
Two fixed and different strings ipad and opad are defined as follows:
(‘i’ and 'o' are mnemonics for inner and outer):
 ipad = the byte 0x36 repeated B times
opad = the byte 0x5C repeated B times.
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To compute HMAC over the data `text', the following transformation is performed:
H(K XOR opad, H(K XOR ipad, text))
That is to say,
1. Append zeros to the end of K to create a B byte string (e.g., if K is of
length 20 bytes and B=64, then K will be appended with 44 zero bytes
0x00),
2. XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the B byte string computed in step 1 with
ipad,
3. Append the stream of data to the B byte string resulting from step 2,
4. Apply H to the stream generated in step 3,
5. XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the B byte string computed in step 1 with
opad,
6. Append the H result from step 4 to the B byte string resulting from step 5
7. Apply H to the stream generated in step 6 and output the result
The key for HMAC can be of any length (keys longer than B bytes are first hashed using
H).  However, less than L bytes is strongly discouraged, as it would decrease the security
strength of the function.  Keys longer than L bytes are acceptable but the extra length
would not significantly increase the function strength.
HMAC can generate a hash value for a public key that requires the user password as an
input.  If the user has this hash value, he can verify a public key by hashing it using his
password as an input and if the hash value generated is the same as the one he already
had, he can be certain that the sever key has not been tampered with.  Using this simple
scheme he can make sure that he has received the correct server key.
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ii. Centralized Minimal PKI Approach:
This approach is similar to the solution offered by other commercial SSH vendors that
deploy PKI infrastucture for their clients. It mainly differs in the following ways:
- The scheme for distributing CA certificates or CA certification paths to the user is
different. In conventional solutions a CA certificate can either be installed from a
file off of a floppy ( if it is stored locally on the disk in a PKCS#7 file format), or
through certificate enrollment mechanisms. In our approach the trusted
certificates are installed in the Microsoft certificate store only, primarily because
Internet Explorer is pre-installed on every other machine and they are received
from an ldap server with an HMAC.
- In our approach, users are not issued certificates. Only the server is issued
certificate. Protecting a Certificate Authority by a log in mechanism and allowing
students to access it within and outside of Dartmouth realm makes the Certificate
Authority vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, in this approach, Certificate Authority
has access limited only to system administrators unlike SSH clients by SSH Inc,
where users are required to either have certificates or key pairs.
- An additional component is added to the protocol that stores CA certification
paths.
This approach requires that:
1. The user on the client machine must have:
ß A username and a password on the server machine, and
ß He must remember the URL from where he retrieves a hash of
the certification path, and the certification path itself. HMAC is
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used to generate the hash for the certificate path. It takes the
user password as a Key.
2. The server must have:
ß A server certificate (verified by a root certificate or a certificate
chain)
3. A Single Certificate Authority that issues:
ß Server certificates for all the machines running the ssh server,
4. A URL that is connected to an LDAP10 server or a database that stores a
list of usernames and their corresponding hash of a certificate path.11
5. A Hash generation tool that populates the LDAP database.
iii. How it works:
Suppose a Professor at the CS Department in Dartmouth goes to California to attend a
conference. While he is in California, he decides to do an “ssh log in” to one of the
machines in Dartmouth. He initiates the connection to ab.cs.dartmouth.edu:
1. ab.cs.dartmouth.edu sends the server certificate to the client machine,
2. As the professor is using the client machine for the first time, his ssh client has
no means to verify the server certificate.
3. He types in the URL address, which is connected to an LDAP server and sends
his username to it.
                                                 
10 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol. Any other database can also be used.
11 A prototype LDAP server, using OpenLDAP was set up that stored a few usernames and their
corresponding hash values. A separate tool generated those hash values. Currently the process is
not automated for a centralized CA Approach.
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4. The LDAP looks up the username and sends back the certification path and the
hashed CA certification path corresponding to that.
5. The SSH client now has
a. The server certificate,
b. A hash of CA certification path,
c. The CA certification path
6. The Professor types in his passphrase, that is used as an Initialization Key (its is
also referred to as shared key and preferably should be 20 bytes) and generates
a hash of the certification path received. The generated hash is compared with
the hash received from the LDAP server. If they match, the professor is
ascertained that he received a valid certification path.
7. The client validates the server certificate using the certification path received,
and he may also install it on the client if he plans to use the same client machine
in future, otherwise discard the certification path.
8. Once the server certificate is verified, a symmetric shared key is established and
the user sends in his username and password to the ssh server in an encrypted
tunnel.
9. The ssh server verifies the username and password, and if the verification is
successful, ssh server sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS packet,
and authentication succeeds.
iv. A Decentralized Non-CA Approach:
This approach offers a solution that is simple and easy to set up. The underlying theory is
the same as that of a centralized CA Approach.
a. The user on the client machine must have:
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 i. a username and a password on the server machine, and
 ii. he must remember the URL from where he retrieves a hash of
the server certificate. The hashing algorithm that is used to
generate the hash for the server certificate takes the user
password (20 byte long max) that is used as a shared key  in
HMAC.
b. The server must have:
 i. a key pair
c. A URL that is connected to a web page that stores a list of hostnames
and their corresponding public key hashes.
d. A keyed-hash generation tool on the server machine.
Continuing with the same example:
1. ab.cs.dartmouth.edu sends the server public key to the client machine,
2. The professor is using the client machine for the first time, therefore the SSH
client has no means to verify the server certificate.
3. He types in the URL address, to retrieve the hash of the server key for
ab.cs.dartmouth.edu. The hash is saved into a file.
4. The SSH client now has
a. The server’s public key,
b. A hash of the public key,
5. The Professor types in his password, (a shared key and preferably should be 20
bytes) and a hash of the server’s public key is generated. The generated hash is
compared with the hash received from the web page. If the two hashes match,
the professor is ascertained that he received a valid server public key.
6. The SSH client accepts the server’s public key.
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7. A symmetric shared key session already established is used and the professor
sends in his username and password to the ssh server in an encrypted tunnel.
A hash generation tool is needed that can be used by the user to generate hashes for the
server’s public key. The hash generation tool takes in as input, the path to the directory
(e.g. ~alice/public_html/ssh-hashes/ ) and the user password. It then creates a hash of all
the public keys present in /etc/ssh/ and copies each hash as a separate file into web
directory. Typically there are two public keys an RSA-based key and a DSA-based key
for every ssh server. Using this tool, a user can populate his web archive of hashes that
he can retrieve on any client machine via a web browser and then proceed with
authentication.
v. Is it really secure?
Both the approaches presented in this paper stem from the basic fact that the user can
use his password as a shared secret key to create a hash. Let us critically analyze our
authentication protocols to determine if this authentication mechanism is really secure.
Before we proceed, it is important to analyze the structure of a certificate.
A certificate is uniquely identified by either its Subject Name, (which is a composite of
Common Name, Organization Unit, Organization, Location, State, Country, Email ) or one
of the X509v3 extensions that can be added to any server certificate issued. X509v3
extensions may include a server name, or a DNS address. In our case, the server name
ab.cs.foo.edu would be used as a unique identifier and would be entered as a Common
Name. All the fields in a certificate, including the public key, are signed by the
corresponding private key component for that certificate. The self-signed root certificate
can then also be appended to the server certificate. This forms a 2-node certificate chain.
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Typically the private key of the server is not attached on to the certificate. However, if
needed, it can be attached to the certificate and protected by encrypting it with a
password. Therefore any person who knows that password can extract the private key
from such a certificate. Such certificates are said to have “exportable keys”. In our case
we will not use certificates with exportable keys as they are open to password attacks.
Given this basic structure of the certificate being used, let us evaluate all the steps of the
protocol.
Centralized CA Approach:
1. ab.cs.dartmouth.edu sends the server certificate to the client machine. An
attacker who has a different server certificate issued by the same certificate
authority can intercept the server certificate. Suppose he wants to pose as
ab.cs.dartmouth.edu. He replaces the server certificate, with his own certificate.
Certificate verification would fail in such a scenario because when the ssh client
looks at the uniquely identifying field of the certificate, it would not be the one it
expected. The IP address x509v3 extension would not match. If the attacker
forges it to be the same, he would not be able to modify his signature to match
the forged IP extension, as the CA generated the signature, therefore the
certificate verification would fail again. The user would verify the signature of the
attacker using the CA’s public key and match it with the credentials provided
which would not be the same. This establishes the fact that the attacker cannot
forge a certificate, even if he has a certificate issued by the same certificate
authority.
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2. The user types in the URL address, which is connected to an LDAP server and
sends his username to it.
a. A malicious user can intercept, the username and send back a different
hash of a ‘modified’ certification path, and a modified certification path
itself. However when the user generates the hash for the ‘modified
certification path’, it would not match the hash received, as he uses his
password as the  “hash input key”. The attacker would not know the
password used by the user. The only way to crack this protocol is by
cracking the password used. That can be done by dictionary attacks or
by using other such techniques to guess a password. Therefore it is
important that the user selects a long password and fulfills the
requirements of a good password to ensure that this protocol is secure.
3. Suppose the server certificate changes. In such a scenario, an attacker could
use the old invalid server certificate from a previous session and successfully
pose as the server. The user would receive the old certificate, and he would
retrieve the hashed CA certification path, and the CA certification path from the
ldap server. As the CA’s public key has not been modified, the user would
validate the invalid server certificate, and send his username and plaintext
password to the attacker. There are two ways to avoid this problem. Firstly, the
usage of Certificate Revocation Lists [1,7] or OSCP [10] can inform users that a
certificate has been revoked. In that case, the user would check whether the
certificate has been revoked or not. If it has been revoked, he would not continue
authentication with an invalid certificate. This approach requires addition of
components to the existing protocol, which would query the status of the
certificate, retrieved at the client end and manage or store certificate revocation
[2] information at the server end. A simpler solution to the problem is that server
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certificates issued are irrevocable. What that means is that once a server is
assigned a certificate, it cannot be changed until it expires. Once the server
certificate is expired it would be recertified. This option does not complicate the
protocol. This protocol is secure as long as the private key corresponding to the
certificate is protected and safe. We chose the latter solution. The primary reason
for that is that we want minimal extensions to the SSH2 protocol, so that it can be
used the way it is used now. SSH is used as a replacement for Telnet, therefore
it should be kept as simple as possible. Secondly, the security of any public key
infrastructure relies on the fact that private keys are secure. If the private keys
were compromised, any PKI deployment would be compromised.
Decentralized non-CA Approach:
1. ab.cs.dartmouth.edu sends the public key to the client machine. An attacker
intercepts and replaces it with his own public key. Once the client receives the
public key, he retrieves the keyed-hash of the public key. He hashes the public
key and compares it with the hash received. The two hashes would not match.
2. The attacker now attempts to send his own keyed-hash instead of the one
retrieved from the website. To be able to generate a valid hash, the attacker
needs to know one valid piece of information, the passphrase that the professor
used to generate the hash. Unless he gets access to that passphrase, he will not
be able to generate a valid hash. Therefore if he replaces a valid hash from the
website with one of his own, that hash would not match to the one that the
professor would produce using his passphrase on the spoofed public key
received. Therefore attackers attempt to hack the professor’s account are foiled.
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3. Suppose the server public key changes. In such a scenario, the professor would
be vulnerable to a replay attack. There are two ways in which such an attack can
be avoided. In a simpler model, the professor can be informed via email, as soon
as possible, of the change in the server key so that he can update his web page
repository of hashes. This methodology is not very secure as there are security
risks related to email spoofing that come into the picture. The second
methodology requires further modifications to the SSH2 protocol. In the existing
the SSH2 protocol, once the server is verified, the user sends his username and
password as plaintext in the encrypted channel. Replacing the current user
authentication method with a “challenge response” protocol would ensure that a
replay attack cannot be performed. Incase the old private key was compromised;
the professor would not be vulnerable to an attack. However he will not be able
to connect to the server until he updates his web page repository.
4. Attacks due to DNS Spoofing are also defied by the verification of the host key.
Suppose that the user logs in on a client machine for the first time and types in
ab.cs.dartmouth.edu that maps to 129.172.111.4. However, an attacker spoofs it
so that the user attempts to connect to 129.172.111.5 instead of 129.172.111.4.
The fact that the attacker can only posses the public key of the server and not
the private key, implies that he cannot generate the signatures that validate the
payload during the key exchange, therefore he can not successfully establish a
shared secret key which follows a successful server authentication at the
transport layer. In a scenario where the physical IP address of a server changes
(e.g. ab.cs.dartmouth.edu has its IP address updated to 129.172.111.6 from
129.172.111.4 ), the user would receive a warning that IP address has been
changed. If the user continues, the host key would be verified and the protocol
would proceed as usual.
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To recapitulate the two authentication methodologies discussed and analyzed so far,
following diagrams (figures 3 and 4) displays how the protocols would proceed incase of
successful authentication, where the mobile user is on a client machine that does not
have the server keys for the ssh server that he connects to for the first time.
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Figure 3 Semi-centralized minimal PKI Scheme
Figure 4 Decentralized Scheme
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4. DESIGN CHOICES FOR DARTMOUTH’S ACADEMIC SETTING
One of the goals of this paper was to come up with a deployable, scalable and a
manageable basic Public Key Infrastructure for our authentication scheme to work with
ssh. The existent network infrastructure at Dartmouth is ideal to emulate a complex real
world network topology. It has the state-of-art computer network technology with wireless
network deployment in progress. Successful deployment in such a setting would be a
leading example for the academia and the industry to follow.
In this section, several design questions are presented to the reader. The implications of
the alternative solutions for each design question are evaluated and a specific solution is
opted based on that.
4A. Suitable and scalable Certificate deployment methodology
How many certificate authorities should be set up for “Centralized CA Approach”?
1. One for each LAN (several LANs within each building)
2. One for each Department (roughly 20 departments)
3. One for each School (Undergraduate, Graduate, Medical and Engineering
Schools)
4. Only one for the whole Dartmouth Network that can only be accessed from
within Dartmouth, only by the administrators.
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We opt for setting up only one Certificate Authority [8] for the whole Dartmouth network.
The reasons for this choice are as follows:
First of all, this eliminates the hassle of intermediate certificates (cross certificates or
bridge certificates) that would be generated if we have multiple Certificate Authorities
within Dartmouth realm. We will not be required to set up trust policies between them.
The system administrators will not have to co-ordinate with each other to determine the
rank of their certificate authority in a Certificate Authority Hierarchy.  In a complex
Certificate Authority Hierarchy, compromising the security of one CA could compromise
the whole PKI. Furthermore, if a system administrator decides to change the root
certificate on a CA, his change would be rippled through all the other CA’s who may have
its certificate in their certification paths. We follow the “KISMIF” principle (Keep it simple,
make it functional).
Secondly, as the Certificate Authority is the most crucial building block in a Public Key
Infrastructure, it is really important that the Certificate Authority is protected from any
possible security breach or unauthorized access. All effort should go in securing just
“one” CA instead of several CAs.
Thirdly, it is easy to make just one CA fault tolerant, and it would require lesser
resources. To achieve greater fault tolerance that Certificate Authority can be backed up
every day on another machine, and if on a given day, the Certificate Authority crashes,
the backup machine can quickly take its place.
Fourthly, it is logical to have multiple CA if they allow “load sharing”. However in our
scenario, only the machines running ssh servers are issued certificates. The users are
not issued certificates. The root CA would not be required to extensively manage
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Certificate Revocation Lists [1]. Certificates would only be revoked if the ssh server
requests a new certificate if it is lost or deleted from the machine. The fact that there are
no user certificates makes this option suitable.
Lastly, the system administrators would be expected to ensure that they have the latest
CA certification path installed on their LDAP servers. They will not be required to update
the CA certification paths on each ssh server. They would only update the certification
path stored in the LDAP server, which would then update the hashed certificate paths for
each user. That process can be automated. The LDAP server can access the hashes of
the user passwords from /etc/password file. The ldap server would then generate the
hashed certification paths using user specific password hashes that would be different for
each user. In that case the clients would first generate the password hash and then
generate the hash on the CA certification path received.
What data format should be used to generate the digital certificate?
1. X509v3 Certificates, or
2. OpenPGP Certificates
We opted for X509v3 certificates. The reasons for that are multifold. First of all, X.509
standard [4] constitutes a widely accepted basis for such an infrastructure. Secondly,
Microsoft Certificate Store and OpenSSL libraries are both interoperable with x509v3
certificates. Thirdly, x509v3 certificates support extensions that can be added into a
certificate, which can then uniquely identify a certificate on the basis of its IP address
extension.
When should the certificate expire? Should they be revoked or not?
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There are three possible choices:
1. Certificates should have short life spans.
2. Certificates should expire in one to two years.
3. Certificates should have long life spans.
Short life spans would unnecessarily burden the system administrator, who would end up
upgrading the ssh server every now and then with newer server certificates and
consequently updating the data stored and accessed through the LDAP server. It would
require active management of Certificate revocation lists [9] as well. Considering the
analysis for prevention of a replay attack, the server certificates should have long life
spans.
A certificate can be revoked for the following legitimate reasons:
• The private key may have been compromised; in which case, the certificate should
be treated as revoked.
• The binding in the certificate chain, c0..j12,is no longer valid, in which case, cj should
be treated as invalid if it contains the same binding as c0..j.
• The binding may still be valid, but the issuer doesn’t want to vouch for it anymore, in
which case, cj should still be valid.
However it is important to realize that certificate revocation complicates the model and
opens up an opportunity for a security breach due to the replay attack. On the other
hand, the reasons why certification revocation is needed can also not be ignored.
Therefore it would be wise to allow for “minimal" usage of certificate revocation.
                                                 
12 c0..j is a certificate chain where c0 is the certificate from the root certificate authority, cj is the
certificate of the client machine and all the intermediate certificates are of the other CA’s   
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What does one do when his certificate expires?
1. Get a new certificate issued from the CA, for the ssh server.
2. Alternatively, get the old certificate re-certified by sending it to the CA.
“Issuing a certificate” means that the issuer is attesting that a given party is the exclusive
entity that knows the private key matching that public key, hence tasks like renewing
certificates are not trivial in nature as they play a fundamental role in developing a robust
infrastructure.
We opted for the second option. The reason for that is that it offers consistency and
minimizes risks due to replay attacks.
How does the client machine get the server certificate verified?
In a complex Public Key Infrastructure, the client needs to know the "certification path" of
certificates taking the server's public key to the "root" public key that the client knows.
The suitability of the following technique in the context of the SSH2 protocol was
evaluated and then rejected.
1. Delegated path discovery and validation [11,12],
The client must be able to validate the signer and all the entities vouching for the
certificate's validity. The DPV/DPD protocols provide a new approach to certificate
validation. The DPV protocol allows clients to dump their validation duties onto a DPV
server, which validates a certificate by doing all the necessary homework - including
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checking CRLs and CRL change reports - using the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP). OCSP is a request/response mechanism for checking the status of a specific
certificate.
Using the DPD protocol, clients can query a DPD server to collect and pass on all the
information the client needs for local validation. In other words, the client sends
certificates to the server, which returns current information about the certificates and any
related certificates, such as if it is valid or not [12].
2. Our Approach.
Our approach is simple and extends the SSH2 protocol easily. It has no dependency on
an external server other than the ldap server. It also limits the interaction with a certificate
authority.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
The fully decentralized solution described in the paper was completely implemented. We
also tested the following components of the semi-centralized solution to ensure that the
proposed semi-centralized solution was workable:
- Installed LDAP server,
- Hooked up the server with a dB database,
- Populated a table in the database,
- Retrieved a field of the table from the dB through the LDAP server,
The TLS extension which essentially replaced the SSH handshake with a TLS
handshake using certificates was not implemented.
Extending SSH to include this authentication method:
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The existing SSH2 protocol supported by OpenSSH has the bare skeletal structure to
support certificates that does not support certificate verification.  In addition, ssh servers
are already using OpenSSL libraries for encryption, compression and public key
authentication to perform “ssh handshake”.
Following is an Architectural Block diagram that explains how we extend ssh protocol to
support new authentication mechanisms. Authentication Types TLS and First_Time have
been added into the architecture.
Figure 5 Extended SSH2
5A. Application Interface























 SSH2 Protocol Extension
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1. OpenSSH Client and Server (for the Linux World).
2. TeraTerm SSH Client (for the Windows platforms)
The only fully deployed open source SSH server is provided by OpenSSH and is
distributed freely with Red Hat Linux Operating System. NetworkSimplicity.com provides
windows’ port for OpenSSH client and server. The drawback of the OpenSSH source
code is that it does not provide a graphical user interface.
TeraTerm SSH clients that are interoperable with OpenSSH servers, provide a Graphical
User Interface that makes it easy to use on windows platform.
TeraTerm SSH client is an extension to TeraTerm Telnet client, which is also open
source.
Our extension was added to the TeraTerm SSH client, which is a Windows client,
primarily due to the following reason:
- Most of the users at Dartmouth either use Windows or Macintosh Operating
Systems.
Following are some of the Graphical User Interfaces that are displayed once the user
selects to use ssh. A brief description of the functionality is also provided.
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In Figure 6, the user selects one of the radio buttons. If he is a traveling user and is doing
authentication for the first time on the client machine, he selects “Enable first time
authentication”. Then he clicks on the Configure button to download the hashstore from a
website or an ldap server.
Figure 6 Authentication Setup
In Figure 7, the user enters the path to the http server, with the filename for the
hashstore. An HTTP connection is made to the http server, and the file is retrieved if it is
found. Incase an ldap server name is provided then the connection is made to the ldap
server and it is queried for the needed data. As mentioned earlier the “ldap” component
was independently tested but was not embedded into this solution
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Figure 7 Retrieve Hash Store
Once the user has successfully retrieved the hash store, he initiates the ssh connection.
He provides the server name and waits on the Authentication setup window while he
retrieves the public key of the server for the first time. When the key is retrieved, the user
is prompted with the following figure.
Figure 8 Verify server public key received
If the user clicks ‘No’ then the SSH protocol proceeds as if nothing was modified and the
user would be vulnerable to the “man in the middle attack”. However, if the user clicks on
‘Yes’, then he would be prompted to enter the pass phrase to generate the HMAC hash.
Figure 9 Enter Pass Phrase
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If the two hashes match (hash generated and the hash stored in the hashstore), then the
public key in the keyblob received from the ssh server is verified and the SSH2 protocol
proceeds to establish a shared session key. The rest of the SSH2 protocol is the same.
If the user selects the “Use User Certificate to log in” option on Authentication Setup
window, then he has to select a user certificate that is stored in the “Personal” Microsoft
Certificate Store. In the current implementation, the user public key blob is filled up by
taking the public key from the user certificate in case of public key authentication. This
feature has been implemenedt but not fully tested yet.
Figure 10 Certificate Selection Window
6. SCOPE OF FUTURE WORK
Following modifications to the graphical interface and functionality were suggested to
enhance usability of the prototype:
1. User should be prompted right in the beginning, if he wants to use the
conventional SSH protocol or the modified version,
2. If the user selects the modified version then no warning messages
should pop up after server key verification,
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3. The hashstore should be retrieved for every ssh session from the website
entered by the user. The hashstore would not live on the borrowed machine
and would be deleted once the ssh session disconnects.
The solution presented in this paper primarily deal with the “Man in the Middle Attack”.
However, as discussed in the paper, in the existing SSH2 protocol, once the server is
verified, the user sends his username and password as plaintext in the encrypted
channel. Although the protocol is no longer vulnerable to the man in the middle attack, it
allows for the possibility of a replay attack if the server’s public key changes. To further
strengthen the SSH2 protocol, user authentication should be replaced with a Challenge
Response Authentication method, such as MSCHAPv2. The TTLS protocol specifically
allows for that, so should the SSH2. Also SSH Client should be integrated to Certificate
Stores provided by browsers such as IE, so that the users can easily install CA
certificates on their machines that verify server certificates. The foundations for that work
has already been laid in our thesis work.
In the future the wireless networks would merge into the wired networks, offering an
acceptable level of security for both. Currently the wireless gurus are looking at the
SSH2, IPSec, TLS, TTLS, PEAP and 8021x protocols for authentication. If the existing
vulnerabilities of the SSH2 are resolved and an approach is developed that requires no
maintenance by the user without necessitating the deployment of a Certificate Authority,
it would make it a top candidate for authentication and tunneling in both the wired and
wireless networks. Therefore, the feasibility of the SSH2 for wireless authentication
should also be evaluated so that it can be modified to better fit a wireless network as well.
All the code that was used and modified in this project is open source and can be
downloaded from http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~yasir/Thesis/. The binaries for the
54
modified TeraTerm ssh clients are also available. The code contains all the needed
OpenSSL libraries, crypt32 libraries from Microsoft platform SDK needed for certificate
management. A readme.txt file explains how to setup the client, and the hash generation
tool.  There needs to be some more work done on the ssh server with regards to
certificate verification using CA Certification Path. Individuals who may be interested in
continuing with this work can contact the PKI Lab at ISTS, Dartmouth.
7. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
Developing a Public Key Infrastructure to be used with OpenSSH in an academic
environment expose us to particularly interesting and different scenarios where we have
to take into account the design considerations as discussed in the previous sections of
this paper. Following commercial SSH products also offer PKI based solutions.
7A. F-SSH:
An F-Secure product, F-SSH claims to have the requisite design to be usable
with Certificate Authorities. However they have not developed a toolkit or a
product that incorporates PKI as yet. The authentication method that they support
which can provide Certificate verification is PAM (pluggable Authentication
Mode). However, PAM is typically used with smart cards.
7B. SSH Client 3.2.0, SSH Communications Security Inc:





- SSH Certification Toolkits. 
SSH provides their own suit of products that allows for certificate based mutual
authentication.
SSH Client by SSH Inc. is aimed to ‘do it all’ that may be needed for a Public Key
Infrastructure. It discovers CA on a LAN, checks CRL’s and handles all the related
functionality of generating a user certificate and installing it and also installing the
certification paths. One of the major drawbacks of their solution is that a user cannot use
password authentication and also perform the new server authentication mechanism
other than the local database verification that they support.
Keeping in view the following factors:
- Ease of management and deployment,
- Scalability: It should work equally well with server machines within the same
network or server machines across different domains,
- Modularized addition to the existing open source OpenSSH. We add an
independent module into the SSH client
- Open source so that it is available to everyone and anyone, within the export
restrictions,
- And most importantly, using usernames and passwords, instead of user
certificates,
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Our solution is unique in its nature as it is simple and embeds OpenSSH into PKI in a
manageable way, even for an academic setting as big as the one at Dartmouth. Our
solution strengthens SSH against “the Man in the middle attack”. We present two
approaches, a centralized approach that requires a CA and a decentralized one that does
not require a CA. The ease of use and deployment of the “decentralized non CA
approach” distinguishes our solution from the one provided by SSH Inc, which is based
on a PKI Infrastructure with Certificate Authorities. Given the current state of PKI, as both
the academia and the industry strive to develop internet drafts for standardized protocols
that would make the deployment and management of such infrastructure relatively
manageable, the fact of the matter remains that currently there does not exist a
homogenous, easy to deploy Public Key Infrastructure mechanism. Most of the small
corporate settings do not need to invest and develop a hierarchical trust model for a PKI.
Their needs are simple. The users want to connect to a “few” machines remotely. They
create VPN to access their corporate network or use SSH to access data securely over
connections. Our decentralized approach is ideal for such small-scale corporate
environments. The users do not have to learn the how to use user certificates and the
system administrators do not have to setup a PKI. Our centralized CA approach is suited
for larger networks with several users. It develops a PKI infrastructure by having the
minimal set of components that are needed to set up. Design constraints and policies are
set to achieve scalability with minimal set up effort that would require minimal
management effort as well. Unlike SSH Inc, our PKI design does not require the user to
interface with the CA, which makes it more secure. To sum up, our solution makes ssh
usage more secure for both, small and large networks.
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9. Appendix -  Code Snippets Used to Extend TTSSH.






BOOL GetFileFromWeb ( char* strServerName2,
   char* URL
 )
{
CString           strObject;
INTERNET_PORT     nPort;
DWORD             dwServiceType;
DWORD    dwAccessType = INTERNET_OPEN_TYPE_PRECONFIG;
CInternetSession  session("Tera Term", dwAccessType);
CHttpConnection*  pServer = NULL;
CHttpFile*        pFile = NULL;
CString strServerName(strServerName2);
AfxParseURL( URL,




      pServer = session.GetHttpConnection(strServerName, nPort);
      pFile = pServer->OpenRequest(







      pFile->SendRequest();
      DWORD dwStatusCode;
      pFile->QueryInfoStatusCode(dwStatusCode);
if(dwStatusCode == HTTP_STATUS_OK)
{














       }
myfile.Close();
MessageBox(NULL,"Hash file retrieved successfully!",





















static int getCN(PCERT_NAME_BLOB name, LPTSTR str, DWORD len)
{
      PCERT_RDN_ATTR pAttr;
BYTE *buffer = NULL;
ULONG sz = 0;













if ((buffer = ( BYTE *)GlobalAllocPtr( GMEM_MOVEABLE |
                               GMEM_ZEROINIT, sz )) == NULL)


































if (cd == NULL)
return;
if (cd->expDate != NULL)
GlobalFreePtr(cd->expDate);
if (cd->friendlyName != NULL)
GlobalFreePtr(cd->friendlyName);
if (cd->hash.pbData != NULL)
GlobalFreePtr(cd->hash.pbData);
if (cd->issuedBy != NULL)
GlobalFreePtr(cd->issuedBy);









CertDescription *cd = (CertDescription *)GlobalAllocPtr(
        GMEM_MOVEABLE | GMEM_ZEROINIT, sizeof(CertDescription) );
if ((sz =(ULONG)getCN(&pCertContext->pCertInfo->Subject,
           NULL, 0)) > 0)
{
sz *= sizeof(TCHAR);
cd->issuedTo = ( LPTSTR )GlobalAllocPtr(
                            GMEM_MOVEABLE | GMEM_ZEROINIT, sz);
getCN(&pCertContext->pCertInfo->Subject,cd->issuedTo,
                  sz);
}
if ((sz = (ULONG) getCN(&pCertContext->pCertInfo->Issuer,
            NULL, 0)) > 0)
{
sz *= sizeof(TCHAR);
if ((cd->issuedBy = ( LPTSTR )GlobalAllocPtr(
                 GMEM_MOVEABLE | GMEM_ZEROINIT, sz)) == NULL)
goto err;
getCN(&pCertContext->pCertInfo->Issuer, cd->issuedBy,
            sz);
}
FileTimeToSystemTime(&pCertContext->pCertInfo->NotAfter,
                          &sysTime);








if ((cd->expDate = ( LPTSTR )GlobalAllocPtr( GMEM_MOVEABLE|
                    GMEM_ZEROINIT, sz * sizeof(TCHAR) )) == NULL)














if (sz > 0)
     {
if ((cd->friendlyName = ( LPWSTR )GlobalAllocPtr(
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if (cd->hash.cbData > 0) {
if ((cd->hash.pbData = ( PBYTE )GlobalAllocPtr(
                 GMEM_MOVEABLE | GMEM_ZEROINIT,
























#define MY_ENCODING_TYPE  (PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING |
X509_ASN_ENCODING)




extern void HandleError(char *s);
extern BOOL GetandCompareHash( unsigned char* szIPandHash );
extern BOOL puthHash( unsigned char* szIPandHash );
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extern void verifyhashing(PTInstVar pvar,
  int bits,
  unsigned char FAR * exp,




UCHAR *temp = exp;
UCHAR *temp2 = exp;
int i = 0;
int count = 0;
unsigned int  MsgDigestLen = 0;
UCHAR szHost[128] = "";
UCHAR cleanexp[4096] = "";
DWORD lpdwResult = 0;
SendMessage(pvar->NotificationWindow,
        WM_COMMAND,
ID_HASHPASSPHRASE,
0);
for (i =0; i<4;i++)
{










 HMAC_Update(&ctx, cleanexp, strlen(cleanexp) );
HMAC_Final(&ctx, MsgDigest, &MsgDigestLen);
count = 0;
for (i =0; i<3;i++)
{
























"Server public key verification failed.\n"\
"Possible Reasons:\n"\
"1. Public Key Hash did not match.\n"\
"2. Hashing password used is incorrect.\n"\
"3. HashStore does not contain the entry for host





} // End of HASHING
void HandleError(char *s)
{
    MessageBox(NULL,s,"Error",MB_OK);
GetLastError();
    exit(1);
}
BOOL GetandCompareHash( unsigned char* szIPandHash )
{
char buffer[4096];
if( (stream  = fopen( "hashstore.txt", "r+" )) == NULL )
exit(1);
fread( buffer, sizeof( unsigned char ), 4096, stream );







- Code for Handling the public key when received.
static BOOL handle_server_public_key(PTInstVar pvar) {
  int server_key_public_exponent_len;
  int server_key_public_modulus_pos;
  int server_key_public_modulus_len;
  int host_key_bits_pos;
  int host_key_public_exponent_len;
  int host_key_public_modulus_pos;
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  int host_key_public_modulus_len;
  int protocol_flags_pos;
  int supported_ciphers;
  char FAR * inmsg ;
  char FAR * dest = (char FAR * ) malloc( 2048 );
  int len = 0;
  if (!grab_payload(pvar, 14)) return FALSE;
  server_key_public_exponent_len = get_mpint_len(pvar, 12);
  if (!grab_payload(pvar, server_key_public_exponent_len + 2))
return FALSE;
  s e r v e r _ k e y _ p u b l i c _ m o d u l u s _ p o s  =  1 4  +
server_key_public_exponent_len;
  server_key_public_modulus_len = get_mpint_len(pvar,
server_key_public_modulus_pos);
  if (!grab_payload(pvar, server_key_public_modulus_len + 6))
return FALSE;
  host_key_bits_pos = server_key_public_modulus_pos + 2 +
server_key_public_modulus_len;
  host_key_public_exponent_len = get_mpint_len(pvar,
host_key_bits_pos + 4);
  if (!grab_payload(pvar, host_key_public_exponent_len + 2))
return FALSE;
  host_key_public_modulus_pos = host_key_bits_pos + 6 +
host_key_public_exponent_len;
  host_key_public_modulus_len = get_mpint_len(pvar,
host_key_public_modulus_pos);
  if (!grab_payload(pvar, host_key_public_modulus_len + 12))
return FALSE;
  protocol_flags_pos = host_key_public_modulus_pos + 2 +
host_key_public_modulus_len;
  inmsg = pvar->ssh_state.payload;
  CRYPT_set_server_cookie(pvar, inmsg);
  if (!CRYPT_set_server_RSA_key(pvar, get_uint32(inmsg + 8),
pvar->ssh_state.payload + 12,
    inmsg + server_key_public_modulus_pos)) return FALSE;
  if (!CRYPT_set_host_RSA_key(pvar, get_uint32(inmsg +
host_key_bits_pos),
    inmsg + host_key_bits_pos + 4,
    inmsg + host_key_public_modulus_pos)) return FALSE;
  pvar->ssh_state.server_protocol_flags = get_uint32(inmsg +
protocol_flags_pos);
  supported_ciphers = get_uint32(inmsg + protocol_flags_pos +
4);
  if (!CRYPT_set_supported_ciphers(pvar, supported_ciphers,
supported_ciphers)) return FALSE;
  if (!AUTH_set_supported_auth_types(pvar, get_uint32(inmsg +
protocol_flags_pos + 8))) return FALSE;
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  /* this must be the LAST THING in this function, since it
can cause host_is_OK to be called. Used specifically for first
time authentication*/
  HOSTS_check_host_key(pvar, pvar->ssh_state.hostname,
    get_uint32(inmsg + host_key_bits_pos),
    inmsg + host_key_bits_pos + 4,
    inmsg + host_key_public_modulus_pos);
  return FALSE;
}
BOOL HOSTS_check_host_key(PTInstVar pvar, char FAR * hostname,
                         int bits, unsigned char FAR * exp,
                        unsigned char FAR * mod)
{
  int found_different_key = 0;
  if (pvar->hosts_state.prefetched_hostname != NULL
    && stricmp(pvar->hosts_state.prefetched_hostname,
       hostname) == 0
    && match_key(pvar, bits, exp, mod)) {
    SSH_notify_host_OK(pvar);
    return TRUE;
  }
  if (begin_read_host_files(pvar, 0))
  {
    do {
      if (!read_host_key(pvar, hostname, 0)) {
        break;
      }
      if (pvar->hosts_state.key_bits > 0) {
        if (match_key(pvar, bits, exp, mod)) {
          finish_read_host_files(pvar, 0);
          SSH_notify_host_OK(pvar);
          return TRUE;
        } else {
          found_different_key = 1;
        }
      }
    } while (pvar->hosts_state.key_bits > 0);
    finish_read_host_files(pvar, 0);
  }
  pvar->hosts_state.key_bits = bits;
  pvar->hosts_state.key_exp = copy_mp_int(exp);
  pvar->hosts_state.key_mod = copy_mp_int(mod);
  free(pvar->hosts_state.prefetched_hostname);
  pvar->hosts_state.prefetched_hostname = _strdup(hostname);
    if(MessageBox(NULL,
 "You have received the Server Public Key. \n"
 "Do you wish to verify it using the hash \n" \
 "stored in file or retrieved from ldap?",
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                "Verification",
 MB_ICONQUESTION | MB_YESNO)
             == IDYES)
  {
  Authflag = 1;
  //CRYPT_get_server_key_info(pvar, dest, len);
  if ( pvar->crypt_state.server_key.RSA_key != NULL)
  {
   char FAR * keydata = format_host_key(pvar);
      verifyhashing(pvar,
  pvar->hosts_state.key_bits,
  keydata,
  pvar->hosts_state.key_mod );
  }
  else
  MessageBox(NULL,"No RSA key","Error",MB_OK);
  }
  if (found_different_key) {
    PostMessage(pvar->NotificationWindow,WM_COMMAND,
                ID_SSHDIFFERENTHOST, 0);
    }
  else {
    PostMessage(pvar->NotificationWindow,
                WM_COMMAND, ID_SSHUNKNOWNHOST, 0);
  }
  return TRUE;
}
- Linux Configurator Code.
/* gcc -o configurator -I../include configurator.c
    ../libcrypto.a
For most of the machines:
gcc -o configurator -I/usr/local/ssl/include configurator.c
usr/local/ssl/libcrypto.a








int puthHash( unsigned char* exp )
{
HMAC_CTX ctx;
char szPassword[128] = "";
char MsgDigest[64];
unsigned char *temp = exp;
unsigned char *temp2 = exp;
int i = 0;
int count = 0;
unsigned int  MsgDigestLen = 0;
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unsigned char szHost[128] = "";
unsigned char cleanexp[4096] = "";
for (i =0; i<4;i++)
{









printf("\nEnter the passphrase to hash:\n");
scanf("%s", &szPassword );
HMAC_Init(&ctx, szPassword,strlen(szPassword), EVP_md5());
HMAC_Update(&ctx, cleanexp, strlen(cleanexp) );
HMAC_Final(&ctx, MsgDigest, &MsgDigestLen);
count = 0;
for (i =0; i<3;i++)
{









if( (stream2  = fopen( "hashstore.txt", "a" )) == NULL )
return -1;
if ( szHost == NULL )
return -1;
printf("\n---Hash stored in hashstore.txt---\n");











printf("This program generates the HMAC Hashes\n"
 "for the public keys of host machines.\n"
"This program is to be run on the local machine\n"
"whose public key is to be hashed\n\n");
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if( (stream  = fopen( "/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub",
                         "r" )) == NULL )
return -1;
fread( buffer, sizeof( unsigned char ), 4096, stream );
fclose(stream);




printf("----String to be Hashed---\n%s", szHost);
puthHash( szHost );
return 0;
}
